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A SUGGESTED ANALYSIS FOR GAS
DIVISION ORDERS
I. INTRODUCTION
Although natural gas was once flared off as an unprofitable by-
product of oil production,' increases in natural gas prices and the
promise of deregulation2 have recently made that industry and its legal
instruments the focus of attention in a number of lawsuits.3 Natural
gas royalty owners whose payments are based on the price of natural
gas have begun to re-examine the lease provisions for those payments,
recognizing that a legal uncertainty may carry the potential for a large
court recovery.4
The division order, a writing directing the royalty payor as to
whom and how much to pay, has been used in the petroleum industry
since the early part of this century,5 yet its legal identity remains less
than clear.6 Nowhere is this legal anonymity more painfully obvious
than when the division order provisions are found to conflict with the
lease provisions.7 As natural gas prices, and lawsuits, increase, it is im-
perative that a satisfactory legal analysis be established for the gas divi-
1. Exxon Corp. v. Middleton, 571 S.W.2d 349, 352 (Tex. Civ. App. 1978), rep'd, 613 S.W,2d
240 (Tex. 1981); see also J. CLARK, THE OIL CENTURY 149-53 (1958).
2. See 15 U.S.C. § 3331(a) (Supp. III 1979).
3. See, e.g., Kingery v. Continental Oil Co., 626 F.2d 1261 (5th Cir, 1980) (royalty owners
challenging meaning of "market value" in the lease); Exxon Corp. v. Middleton, 613 S.W.2d 240
(Tex. 1981) (royalty owners challenging, inter alia, enforceability of gas division orders); Butler v.
Exxon Corp., 559 S.W.2d 410 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977), writ refdn.r.e. (royalty owners challenging
meaning of "sold at the wells" in lease provisions). The Butler opinion neatly sums up the source
of most of the current natural gas based litigation: "The basic dispute results from the fact that
the price of natural gas in the intrastate market in Texas rapidly escalated from the time the gas
discovered under these leases was sold for less than 200 per Mcf in 1970 to over $2.00 per Mcf by
early 1975." 559 S.W.2d at 412.
4. See, e.g., Exxon v. Middleton, 571 S.W.2d 349, 355 (Tex. Civ. App. 1978), ree'd, 613
S.W.2d 240 (Tex. 1981), where at the trial court level the Middletons were awarded $1,027,299 in
damages and $132,333 in prejudgment interest from just one of the defendants.
5. See, e.g., Elliot, Jones & Co. v. Waurika Oil Ass'n, 253 S.W. 601, 602 (rex. Civ. App.
1923) (involving a division order executed in 1919).
6. A division order has been called variously a "device," a "supplementary contract,"
an "instrument" in the nature of a "continuing offer (which may be revoked at any time)
to sell" oil to the purchaser under certain specified conditions, and many variations of
these terms. It is perhaps all of these.
Gregg, Title Examination andDivision Orders, 19 INST. ON OIL & GAS L. & TAX'N 29, 29 (1968).
7. In a recent case, such a conflict prompted a royalty owners' class action suit seeking
$988,000 in damages from the defendant petroleum company. Maddox v. Gulf Oil Corp., 222
Kan. 733, 567 P.2d 1326 (1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1065 (1978).
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sion order so that it may be enforced in its appropriate uses and be
protected from abuse by overreaching lessees or plaintiff royalty hold-
ers. An analysis of the purposes of the division order and the legal
framework underlying the enforcement of oil division orders suggests a
related legal framework for gas division orders.
An oil and gas production arrangement, simplified for purposes of
analysis, usually involves three parties: the landowner who leases the
property for its mineral development; the operator or producer who
leases the property from the landowner and conducts all drilling opera-
tions on the property; the oil and gas purchaser who contracts with the
lessee to purchase the oil and gas produced from drilling on the
property.
In part, the lessor's compensation8 for leasing property is the roy-
alty interest retained through the lease-a share of the oil and gas pro-
duction or its value free of the costs of production.9 In the typical oil
and gas lease, the oil royalty interest is based on an interest in the oil
itself or in the proceeds from the sale of the oil.'0 When oil is produced
and brought to the surface, it is considered personal property," a cer-
tain portion of which belongs to the lessor as a royalty interest.
In contrast to the lessor's possible reservation of an interest in the
oil itself as a royalty, the lessor of gas reserves only a share of the pro-
ceeds from the sale of that commodity' 2 due to the difficulty of gas
storage and the impracticability of the lessor's choosing to take the gas
royalty "in kind."' 3 Title to all gas which may be produced under the
lease vests in the lessee at the time the lease is executed and the lessor
reserves only a share of the potential proceeds.' 4 A gas royalty is an
8. Before drilling begins, the lessor's compensation usually consists of the lease bonus and
drilling delay rentals. See generaly 1 E. KUNTZ, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF OIL AND GAS
§§ 15.5, 15.6 (1962); 8 H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, OIL AND GAS LAW 65, 175-76 (1981).
9. 1 E. BROWN, THE LAW OF OIL AND GAS LEASES § 6.00 (2d ed. 1973); 1 E. KUNTZ, supra
note 8, § 15.4; 8 H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, supra note 8, at 656-58.
10. See generally 3 H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, OIL AND GAS LAW § 659 (1981).
11. See Shreveport-El Dorado Pipe Line Co. v. Bennett, 172 Ark. 804,-, 290 S.W. 929, 931
(1927); Bounds, Division Orders, 5 INST. ON OIL & GAS L. & TAX'N 91, 91 (1954); Gregg, supra
note 6, at 30.
12. 3 H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, supra note 10, § 643.1. "Although... payment in kind
provisions are common in oil royalty clauses, such provisions are only infrequently found in gas
royalty clauses."
13. "Concerning gas royalties the case is entirely different. Gas cannot be delivered in kind,
nor can one-eighth of it be set apart as royalty." S. GLASSMIRE, OIL AND GAS LEASES AND Roy-
ALTIES § 62 (2d ed. 1938).
14. See Craig v. Champlin Petroleum Co., 300 F. Supp. 119, 125 (W.D. Okla. 1969), aj'd,
421 F.2d 236 (10th Cir. 1970) ("The defendant, as lessee under the oil and gas leases, was the
owner of the entire 8/8 of the gas when produced .... ); Tidewater Assoc. Oil Co. v. Clemens,
1982]
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obligation on the part of the lessee to pay a certain amount of money to
the lessor based on the amount of gas production. The royalty obliga-
tion thus creates a debtor-creditor relationship between the lessee and
lessor. 15
II. DIVISION ORDERS
The division order is a writing, usually drafted by the purchaser or
the lessee, executed by the lessor and all parties holding an interest in
the production to be sold.' 6 The division order provides the royalty
payor with a precise and definite statement of whom and how much to
pay.' 7 All parties holding interests in the production are asked to sign
123 S.W.2d 780, 783 (Tex. Civ. App. 1938) ("[Bly the grant in the lease ownership and title to all
the gas produced from the land passed to [the lessee]."); see also AAPL Form 670, Oil and Gas
Lease, reprinted in 3 E. KUNTZ, supra note 8, § 136.12 (gas royalty clauses provide only for money
payment, not for in kind payment, so entire interest in gas, if produced, is in the lessee); R. HEM-
INGWAY, THE LAW OF OIL AND GAS § 7.5, at 325 (1971) ("Title to the gas passes to the lessee
upon execution of the lease."); Bounds, supra note 11, at 110 ("[T]he title to the gas passes to the
lessee in the lease.").
15. Tidewater Assoc. Oil Co. v. Clemens, 123 S.W.2d 780, 784 (Tex. Civ. App. 1938); R.
HEMINGWAY, supra note 14, § 7.5, at 325 ("The relationship between the lessee and the lessor is
not one of principal and agent [as it is in the sale of oil production], but of debtor and creditor.");
Bounds, supra note 11, at 110 ("When gas is used or disposed of by the lessee the relationship of
debtor and creditor arises.").
16. See generally 2 E. BROWN, supra note 9, § 16.02(4)(D)(2); R. HEMINGWAY, supra note 14,
§ 7.5; 4 H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, supra note 10, § 701; Bounds, supra note 11, at 91-123;
Ethridge, Oil and Gas Division Orders, 19 Miss. L.J. 127 (1948).
17. The function of the division order in the oil business is to be implied from the very
name itself. It is an order to the person or company purchasing the production from the
land directing that person or company to make payment for the value of the products
taken in the proportions set out in the division order.
Bounds, supra note 11, at 91.
Payment of royalties is usually made on the basis of division orders. A division order is
an instrument, required by the purchaser of oil or gas, where there is more than one
person interested m the proceeds thereof, fixing the fractional interest of each person
entitled to participate in such proceeds.
Brown, Royal y Clauses in Oil and Gas Leases: Their Nature, Construction and Remediesfor Breach
Thereof, 16 INST. ON OIL & GAS L. & TAX' N 139, 184 (1965).
A division order is an instrument required by the purchaser of oil or gas in order that it
may have a record showing to whom and in what proportions the purchase price is to be
paid. Its execution is procured primarily to protect the purchaser in the matter of pay-
ment for the oil or gas.
Wagner v. Sunray Mid-Continent Oil Co., 182 Kan. 81, -, 318 P.2d 1039, 1047 (1957).
The division order is directed to the party paying royalties. The following excerpt is from an
oil division order which was the subject of litigation in Amerada Petroleum Corp. v. Melton, 139
Okla. 119, 281 P. 591 (1929): "The undersigned, certify and guarantee that they are the legal
owners of all wells ... including the royalty interest and until further notice you will give credit
for oil received from said wells as per directions below .... " Id at 121, 281 P. at 592. For
additional examples of division order forms, see 2 E. BROWN, supra note 9, §§ 18.06-.07; 6 W.
SUMMERS, THE LAW OF OIL AND GAS, §§ 1383-1395 (1967); 4 H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, supra
note 10, §§ 701.1-.3.
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division orders before the sale of the production will occur," since the
division order is intended to provide the purchaser with indemnity for
the payments made. 9 The division order usually contains language
that it is revocable or that it is to be in effect until further notice.2° It is
drafted after a title search by the lessee or royalty payor to establish all
interest holders in the production2 and contains language to effect the
signors' warranty of title.2 2 Finally, the division order contains specific
language as to how the royalty interest owner shall be paid, including
where and when payment shall be received, and how the amount of
payment, based on the royalty interest, shall be calculated.23
The division order serves two general purposes, although it may be
drafted to accomplish other ends as well. The first purpose is to stipu-
late the owners of interests in the production and to warrant title in
those interests.24 The division order provides the royalty payor with
18. Although a royalty interest holder has a right to receive payment, that right may not be
enforceable unless the royalty interest holder has signed a division order. See, e.g., Blausey v.
Stein, 61 Ohio St. 2d 264, -, 400 N.E.2d 408, 410-11 (1980) ("We hold that the requirement that
appellant execute a division order prior to receiving her royalty payments does not contravene any
specific provision of the lease, and is not such a burden that it can be considered an attempted
modification of the agreement."). But see 2 E. BROWN, supra note 9, § 16.02(4)(D)(2) (suggesting
that the lessee who withholds royalty payment until the royalty owner has signed a division order
may be liable for breach of his express lease obligation to pay royalties as well as breach of the
lessee's implied covenant to market the production).
19. See Gregg, supra note 6, at 30:
The necessity for a division order for the protection of the purchaser is obvious. The oil
and gas when produced become the personal property of those owning it; and, in order
to avoid liability for conversion, the purchaser has the duty and obligation to determine
the ownership of the personalty which he is receiving for his own use, and to secure the
agreement of the owners to his taking and the terms thereof.
See also Wagner v. Sunray Mid-Continent Oil Co., 182 Kan. 81, -, 318 P.2d 1039, 1047 (1957)
("[A division order's] execution is procured primarily to protect the purchaser in the matter of
payment for the oil and gas. . . ."); Blausey v. Stein, 61 Ohio St. 2d 264, -, 400 N.E.2d 408, 410
(1980) ("A division order is a direction and authorization to the purchaser of oil to distribute the
purchase price in a specified manner."); 4 H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, supra note 10, § 701
("There is, then, an obvious need for protection for the distributor of such fund against liability
for improper payment. To meet this need, instruments known as division orders . . . are em-
ployed."); Brown, supra note 17, at 185 ("[T]he main purpose of the typical division order is to
protect the purchaser of products produced on a lease in a division of the proceeds, paid by him
.") (emphasis in original).
20. 2 E. BROWN, supra note 9, § 16.02(4)(D)(2) (terminability at any time is a distinguishing
feature of the division order).
21. For a description of this process, see Gregg, supra note 4, at 34-46, 85-88.
22. "The undersigned hereby certify and guarantee that they are the legal owners in the
proportion set out below of all the oil produced from. ... 4 H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, supra
note 10, § 701.1.
23. "Provisions concerning the price of casinghead gas and natural gas tend to be rather
complex by reason of the difficulty of allocating costs and profits to various aspects of a continu-
ous process of gathering, treatment, transportation, and sale." 4 H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS,
supra note 10, § 704.6, at 672.
24. When production commences and the lessee attempts to market production, the pur-
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indemnity for theparties who are paid. The second purpose of the di-
vision order is to provide a specific basis for the calculation of royalties,
including a designation of which costs and taxes shall be deducted from
the royalty amount.25 The division order also provides the royalty
payor with indemnity for the amount paid.
A division order most often becomes the basis of a lawsuit where
its provisions conflict with the provisions of the lease as to the payment
of royalties.26 The lessor or royalty owner may not notice any conflict
between the lease and the division order initially and may accept roy-
alty payments according to the division order for some time before
such difference reaches his attention. 7 Once the difference becomes
apparent to him, the royalty owner may revoke the division order, pre-
cluding any future payments until the conflict is resolved. The legal
controversy arises when the royalty owner challenges those payments
chaser requires warranty of title to the production before completing the purchase. The division
order constitutes a specific, concise statement of the interest owners at the time of production.
While the lease and any subsequent recorded transactions already contain the title information set
forth in the division order, the division order compiles all the information current at the time of
production and combines this information with the owners' warranty of title. See cases cited
supra note 19; Bounds, supra note 11, at 92. The lessee in all likelihood could not find a pur-
chaser, and thus could not meet its implied covenant to market the production, unless division
orders warranting the interest holders' title to the production or the proceeds from the sale of the
production were executed.
25. Although the lessee's express duty to pay royalty is created at the time the lease is exe-
cuted, the parties generally do not know what type of production, if any, will be developed. Lease
provisions for royalty are necessarily general to cover the actual production and marketing cir-
cumstances which may result. The provisions in a division order, executed after production is
discovered, can be more specific, incorporating current information. See Simpson v. United Gas
Pipe Line Co., 196 Miss. 293, -, 17 So. 2d 200, 202 (1944) ("Aside from any other question, this
division order establishes and fixes the gas prices to be paid by [buyer] to [royalty holder]."); H.
WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, supra note 10, § 705 ("Thus the lease may provide in very general terms
for the payment of royalty on production and the division order... may contain much more
specific provisions on the same matters. ... ).
26. See, e.g., J.M. Huber Corp. v. Denman, 367 F.2d 104, 110 (5th Cir. 1966) (whether "mar-
ket price" royalty basis in lease is synonymous with proceeds-of-sale royalty basis in division
order); seealso Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Williams, 158 F.2d 723, 727 (5th Cir. 1947); Gonsoulin v.
Shell Oil Co., 321 F. Supp. 900, 901 (W.D. La. 1971); Craig v. Champlin Petroleum Co., 300 F.
Supp. 119, 125 (W.D. Okla. 1969), aJ'd, 421 F.2d 236 (10th Cir. 1970); Maddox v. Gulf Oil Corp.,
222 Kan. 733, -, 567 P.2d 1326, 1328 (1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1065 (1978); Exxon Corp. v.
Middleton, 613 S.W.2d 240, 242, 249-52 (Tex. 1981); Chicago Corp. v. Wall, 156 Tex. 217, -, 293
S.W.2d 844, 846 (1956); Butler v. Exxon Corp., 559 S.W.2d 410, 416 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977), writ
refd nr.e.; Stanolind Oil & Gas Co. v. Terrell, 183 S.W.2d 743, 745 (rex. Civ. App. 1944), writ
refd n.r.e.
27. See Exxon Corp. v. Middleton, 613 S.W.2d 240 (rex. 1981) (royalties were paid for ap-
proximately thirty years before the royalty owners found a conflict between the lease and the
division orders). The "difference" between the lease and the division order may be an error, an
intentional manipulation by the drafter, or a technical legal distinction not apparent to the parties
to the division order. Unfortunately for the defense of the division order drafter, the typical "dif-
ference" has been the result of an intentional manipulation. See Brown, supra note 17, at 185.
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already received under the signed division order. Must the royalty
owner accept the amount and terms stipulated in the division order or
may the royalty payor be held to the amount and terms of the lease as a
court may find them?
When a conflict between a division order and the lease is
presented, judicial treatment of the division order may be unpredict-
able. 8 Presently, there is no judicial agreement as to what a division
order is or how it shall be enforced,2 9 although such instrument has
been in use since the turn of the century and has remained virtually
unchanged .3  Despite the routine use of division orders and general
recognition of the purposes they were designed by the industry to serve,
the fate of a particular division order subjected to judicial scrutiny is
uncertain, as the legal theory behind the existence and enforcement of
division orders has generally lagged behind the needs and intentions of
the oil and gas industry. While there has developed a sufficient legal
theory to accommodate oil division orders, discussed below, the same is
not true of gas division orders, where legal analysis has been sparse and
contradictory. Increasing attention on the gas industry illustrates the
importance of developing a clear legal analysis for the evaluation of gas
division orders which can be relied upon by the parties involved in
shaping their transactions to best achieve their legitimate objectives.
The essential difficulty underlying legal analysis of the division or-
der centers around the consideration issue; specifically, what considera-
tion, if any, does the royalty owner receive for the execution of the
division order? If the royalty owner does not receive consideration, is
the division order enforceable on another legal basis such as promis-
sory estoppel? And, if a.division order is revocable upon notice, can it
be a contract? In addition to resolving the consideration issue, an ap-
propriate legal analysis should accommodate the intentions of the par-
ties in signing the division order without permitting such order to
overcome the supremacy of the lease.
28. Compare Butler v. Exxon, 559 5.W.2d 410 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977), writ refdn~r.e. (court
found division orders unenforceable because executed without consideration) with Chicago Corp.
v. Wall, 156 Tex. 217, 293 S.W.2d 844 (1956) (court found division orders were binding contracts).
Interestingly, these contradictory results are the product of the same jurisdiction. The Butler court
distinguished Chicago by stating that there was no detrimental reliance in the Butler case as there
had been in Chicago, but this statement is not explained in light of the facts of either case.
29. See supra note 6.
30. Bounds, supra note 11, at 92.
1982]
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A. Oil Division Orders
A satisfactory legal analysis was developed to accommodate the
intentions of parties to oil division orders through the "sale doctrine."'31
Development of the sale doctrine was possible because of the nature of
oil production and because of the legal interests of the lessor and lessee
in the product. The oil royalty owner may take as royalty a share of the
proceeds from the sale of production or a share of the production it-
self.32 The sale doctrine is based on the possibility of the royalty owner
taking payment in kind. Since the royalty owner can be regarded as
owning part of the oil production in the tank or pipeline, when the
purchaser contracts to buy all the production, he seeks to purchase the
royalty share as well.33
Based on an interpretation that the royalty holder is an actual
owner of a portion of the oil, courts have analogized the signing of the
division order to a standing offer to sell the royalty owner's share of the
oil produced. 34 The division order is an offer for a unilateral contract
which the purchaser may accept by sending the royalty payment. The
standing offer to sell is accepted each time the purchaser sends payment
according to the division order, completing the contract for sale.3S
Once accepted by performance, the offer cannot be revoked.36 The
royalty owner is bound by payments made and accepted, as such pay-
ments are viewed as completed contfacts of sale. Yet the royalty owner
can challenge the division order as a basis for future payments by re-
voking it, since the division order is simply an offer to sell which is
31. See generalI Amerada Petroleum Corp. v. Melton, 139 Okla. 119, 281 P. 591 (1929);
Hogg v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 267 S.W. 482 (Tex. Civ. App. 1924); Ethridge, supra note 16;
Rain, A Further Look at Division Orders andProblems in Accounting and Payment ofProceedsfrom
Oil and Gas, 8 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INsT. 69, 70 (1963).
32. R. HEMINGWAY, supra note 14, § 7.5; Bounds, supra note 11, at 110; Lange, The Produc.
tion of Oil and Gas and Some of the Problems Reached By It, 22 INST. ON OIL & GAS L. & TAX'!
113, 140 (1971); Rain, supra note 31, at 69; Stucky, Current Developments and Views Concerning
Rights and Status of Landowners-Lessors, 21 INST. ON OIL & GAS L. & TAX'N 83, 137 (1970).
33. "In the case of oil production, the purchaser therefor buys oil both from the lessor and
from the lessee. It will prepare a division order to be signed by all owners of an interest in produc-
tion .... " R. HEMINGWAY, supra note 14, § 7.5.
34. See Amerada Petroleum Corp. v. Melton, 139 Okla. 119, 122, 281 P. 591, 593 (1929);
Stanolind Oil & Gas Co. v. Terrell, 183 S.W.2d 743, 745 (rex. Civ. App. 1944), writ refdn.r.e.
35. See, e.g., Amerada Petroleum Corp. v. Melton, 139 Okla. 119, 122,281 P. 591,593 (1929);
Hogg v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 267 S.W. 482, 484 (Tex. Civ. App. 1924). See generally
Ethridge, supra note 16; Comment, Royaly Division Orders, 23 LA. L. REv. 571, 572-73 (1963).
36. See, e.g., Amerada Petroleum Corp. v. Melton, 139 Okla. 119, 122, 281 P. 591, 593 (1929):
Having executed said contract or division order, and defendant having delivered said oil
as directed and instructed in said division order so executed by plaintiff, and all parties
having acted on said division order and contract, the plaintiff cannot recover for oil that
was delivered by his assignee as per his directions.
[Vol. 17:534
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subject to revocation at any time prior to acceptance.37 Thus, in the
case of a conflict between the lease and the division order, the royalty
owner cannot dispute any amount of royalty already paid, if such
amount accords with the division order, but may revoke the division
order as to future payments and require the order to be rewritten in
congruence with the lease.3 s
The sale doctrine places the burden on the lessor to compare the
division order with the lease previously executed to ascertain whether
the royalty provisions correspond. If the lessor fails to compare the two
writings and there is a conflict, the purchaser is not liable for any defi-
ciency in past payments39 as long as royalties were paid according to
the division orders. Although the sale doctrine places the burden of
examination upon the lessor, the doctrine also recognizes the division
order's revocability, so the lessor retains a great degree of control over
the terms of royalty payments.4
The sale doctrine fulfills the oil industry's purpose in requiring di-
vision orders: the protection of the oil purchaser against liability for
any past erroneous royalty payments. The "sale" fiction, based on the
royalty owner's potential interest in the actual production, and the
analogy of the division order to a standing offer to sell satisfactorily
avoid the issue of consideration while providing the lessor and the oil
purchaser with the degree of flexibility and protection they respectively
require.
B. Gas Division Orders
The sale doctrine, however, cannot provide a justification for gas
division orders because of the differences in the physical properties of
oil and gas. Whereas oil can be economically and safely stored, gas
cannot.41 The possibility that the oil royalty owner may take the roy-
37. "When accepted by the Choate Oil Corporation, [the division order] was a contract of
sale complete within itself for the sale of plaintiffs [royalty]." Id (emphasis added).
38. The division order is the royalty owner's direction and authorization to the royalty payor
(4 H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, supra note 10, § 701), or his "standing offer" in terms of the sale
doctrine, thus he controls the content of the directions, or of the "offer."
39. See, ag., Hogg v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 267 S.W. 482, 485 (Tex. Civ. App. 1924)
("We cannot agree ... that 'by signing that division order Hogg put it beyond his power to recall
the permission he thereby gave for the sale and purchase of the incumbered property.' ").
40. At least one court has maintained that the "until further notice" clause in the typical
division order did not render the division order revocable. Kaufman v. Arnaudville Co., 186 So.
2d 337, 341 (La. Ct. App. 1966). The general view, however, seems to be that a distinguishing
feature of the division order is its revocability. See Exxon Corp. v. Middleton, 613 S.W.2d 240,
250 (Tex. 1981); Brown, supra note 17, at 185.
41. See supra note 13.
1982]
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alty in kind rests on the fact that the royalty owner's share may be
safely separated and stored. It is the possibility that the royalty owner
may own an interest in the actual production that the sale doctrine is
based upon.42 In contrast, the gas royalty owner's interest is only in the
proceeds of the sale from the gas.43 There is less possibility that the gas
royalty owner could take the royalty in kind since the physical qualities
of gas prevent the type of safe storage possible with oil. Without the
likelihood of ownership of part of the actual production, there is no
basis for either the sale doctrine or the analogy of the division order to
a standing offer to sell. The typical gas lease grants complete title in the
gas to the lessee.44 Since the lessee owns a one hundred percent interest
in the gas produced, the royalty interest in a gas lease is strictly a duty
on the part of the lessee to pay the lessor a certain amount for the gas
produced.45 Whereas with the oil lease there is a possibility that the
lessee and the royalty holder are co-owners of production (if the royalty
holder were to take the royalty in kind), the relationship between the
lessee and the royalty owner involved in gas production is one of
debtor-creditor. 6
Clearly, the basis for the fiction of the sale doctrine has vanished
since the gas royalty holder neither owns any part of the production to
be sold nor any possibility of such ownership. Complete title to the gas
production is in the lessee. The division order can no longer be consid-
ered a continuing offer to sell which may be accepted by the pur-
chaser's payment of royalty because the royalty owner has nothing to
sell the purchaser. The royalty owner holds only a right to payment
from the lessee.
Since the gas lease grants complete title in the gas production to
the lessee, it may appear that there is no need for the execution of divi-
sion orders because the lessee has the authority to sell all the gas pro-
duced. However, the gas division order serves a slightly different
purpose then that of the oil division order. While the primary function
of the oil division order is to warrant the interest owners' title to the
production, the main purpose of the gas division order is to provide a
specific basis for royalty computations.47 Because gas royalty computa-
42. See supra notes 31-34 and accompanying text.
43. See supra notes 12-15 and accompanying text.
44. See supra note 14.
45. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
46. R_ HEMINGWAY, supra note 14, § 7.5, at 325.
47. Bounds, supra note 11, at 110-11. "Thus the chief problem involved in both the natural
gas and the casinghead gas division order is the question of price or the basis of settlement."
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tions are usually complicated and dependent upon the circumstances of
production,48 the gas division order is essential as the industry device
that specifically provides for the method of computation once the cir-
cumstances of production are known.49 The gas division order also
serves the purpose common to oil division orders of specifying to whom
royalties shall be paid.5
Judicial recognition and enforcement of gas division orders have
been no more predictable than with oil division orders. In examining
situations where the lease and the gas division order conflict or where
the division order contains provisions not expressly within the lease,
courts have developed two distinct rationales for the effect and enforce-
ability of the division order.
III. ANALYSIS OF GAS DIVISION ORDERS
A. Division Orders: Unenforceable Writings?
One judicial view of the enforceability of a division order which
conflicts with the lease defines the order as merely a stipulation of in-
terests executed without consideration. As such, the order is not a con-
tract and therefore is not enforceable.5 ' The gas division order, which
is typically required by the purchaser of the gas, is generally drafted
and submitted to the royalty owners by the lessee.5 The division order
.is primarily executed for the benefit and protection of the purchaser or
the distributor of funds from the sales.53 Yet the royalty owner appar-
48. Id; see supra note 23.
49. Gregg, supra note 6, at 31-32; 4 H. WILLIMS & C. MEYERS, supra note 10, § 705, at 685:
"Thus the lease may provide in very general terms for the payment of royalty on production and
the division order... may contain much more specific provisions on the same matters .... "
50. Whereas in oil division orders the most important purpose of the division order is the
statement of the interest holders and their warranty of title, in the gas division order, warranty of
title by the royalty owners is not so crucial, since the lessee owns complete title to production. The
gas division order signors warrant their interests, but not their title to the gas because they have
none. The purchaser seeks a specific basis for royalty calculations in the gas division order. See
generally Bounds, supra note 11, at 117-18.
51. See Maddox v. Gulf Oil Corp., 222 Kan. 733,-, 567 P.2d 1326, 1328 (1977), cert. denied,
434 U.S. 1065 (1978) ("Here the unilateral attempt by [lessee] in the division orders to amend the
oil and gas leases ... was without consideration. Therefore, the provisions in the division order
regarding waiver of interest are null and void as determined by the trial court."); Butler v. Exxon
Corp., 559 S.W.2d 410,417 ('ex. Civ. App. 1977), writ refdnr.e. ("Basically, a division order sets
forth the interest of each owner for purposes of payment by the purchaser of the product being
sold. It is executed without any consideration."); ef Stanolind Oil & Gas Co. v. Terrell, 183
S.W.2d 743, 745-46 (rex. Civ. App. 1944) (division order not enforceable where it contradicts the
lease; applied to oil division order rather than gas division order).
52. 2 E. BROWN, supra note 9, § 16.02(4)(D)(2).
53. See Wagner v. Sunray Mid-Continent Oil Co., 182 Kan. 81, -, 318 P.2d 1039, 1047
(1957), quoted at note 17, supra.
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ently does not receive consideration for execution of the gas division
order.54 Without consideration, the division order may be unenforce-
able and the lessee unprotected from suit by the royalty owners even
with respect to royalties paid and accepted.55 This reasoning may
render division orders which are found to conffict with the lease inef-
fectual when challenged in court.
If the division orders are found unenforceable for lack of consider-
ation, the lessee may attempt to defend its position on the basis of a
detrimental reliance or promissory estoppel theory.-6 Courts have been
inconsistent in the application of the estoppel doctrine to enforce divi-
sion orders.5 7 The underlying rationale of those decisions refusing to
recognize estoppel based on division orders may be that the lessee's
reliance on a division order drafted by the lessee which states different
54. Under the terms of the lease or assignment, the royalty owners hold the right to be paid.
The division order is not the instrument which creates the royalty interest or the right to receive
royalty. The only apparent benefit of the division order seems to be its provision of a definite
basis for payment for the lessee. As a practical matter, the signing of the division order entitles the
royalty owner to the commencement of royalty payments. However, since the royalty owner al-
ready has the legal right to the royalty under the lease, the royalty payment cannot operate as
consideration since it is, in effect, a pre-existing debt. IA A. Conn1N, CoNTRACTs § 171 (1963).
55. See, e.g., Craig v. Champlin Petroleum Co., 300 F. Supp. 119, 125 (W.D. Okla. 1969),
ajf'd, 421 F.2d 236 (10th Cir. 1970) (execution of division orders did not estop lessors from claim-
ing royalties based on market price as provided in lease); Maddox v. Gulf, 222 Kan. 733, -, 567
P.2d 1326, 1328 (1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1065 (1978) (in the absence of consideration, provi-
sions of division order are null and void); Butler v. Exxon Corp., 559 S.W.2d 410, 417 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1977), writ rerdn~r.e. (execution of division order done without consideration and therefore
not binding).
56. "(1) A promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or forbear-
ance on the part of the promisee or a third person which does induce such action or forbearance is
binding if injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise." RESTATEMENT (SEc-
OND) OF CONTRACrS § 90 (1973). The following cases involve the defendant's invocation of detri-
mental reliance as a defense: Craig v. Champlin Petroleum Co., 300 F. Supp. 119, 125 (W.D.
Okla. 1969), a7'd, 421 F.2d 236 (10th Cir. 1970) (defense failed); Bi-County Properties v. Wam-
pler, 378 N.E,2d 311, 316 (Ill. App. Ct. 1978) (recognized estoppel); Wagner v. Sunray Mid-Conti-
nent Oil Co., 182 Kan. 81, -, 318 P.2d 1039, 1048 (1957) (recognized estoppel); Amerada
Petroleum Corp. v. Melton, 139 Okla. 119, 122, 281 P. 591, 593 (1929) (defense succeeded); Butler
v. Exxon Corp. 559 S.W.2d 410, 417 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977), writ refdn.r.e. (defense failed).
57. See Butler v. Exxon Corp., 559 S.W.2d 410, 417 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977), writ refdn.r.e.
(lessee's receiving royalty payment for three years according to division order did not estop roy-
alty owner from suing for recovery of amount due under lease provisions); accord Craig v.
Champlin Petroleum Co., 300 F. Supp. 119, 125 (W.D. Okla. 1969), af'd, 421 F.2d 236 (10th Cir.
1970) (royalty owners were not estopped by division orders based on lessee's gas sale contract to
claim a larger amount based on the lease royalty provision). But see Gonsoulin v. Shell Oil Co.,
321 F. Supp. 900, 901 (W.D. La. 1971) (Louisiana jurisprudence recognizes estoppel doctrine as
particularly applicable to suits based on division order apportionments because lessee relies on the
division order); Chicago Corp. v. Wall, 156 Tex. 217, -, 293 S.W.2d 844, 846-47 (1956) (evidence
showed that lessee relied on royalty owners' direction in division orders and that royalty owners
could not now claim that lessees should not have so relied); cf Texas Co. v. Pettit, 107 Okla. 243,
247, 220 P. 956, 959 (1923) (oil division orders created an estoppel to claim greater royalties).
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royalty terms than those in the lease is inherently unreasonable.58 In
any case, the invocation of promissory estoppel will not necessarily
protect the lessee when the royalty owner challenges payments received
and cannot provide the requisite legal framework to uphold division
orders.
To conclude that division orders are legally ineffective if they con-
tradict the lease essentially promotes the royalty owners' interests and
the contractual supremacy of the lease. The royalty owners' interests
are significantly protected because the burden is on the lessee to ensure
that the lease and division order correspond and will be interpreted
accordingly in court.59 The royalty owners' interests are further pro-
tected by judicial refusal to recognize that the division order "induces
any action or forbearance"6 resulting in a detrimental reliance.61 In
the absence of detrimental reliance, the royalty owner is not estopped
from bringing suit to challenge royalties paid and accepted under the
terms of the division order. Finally, judicial determination that divi-
sion orders are not binding preserves traditional contract theory,
namely, refusal to enforce a mere writing in the absence of a finding of
consideration.62
While contract theory may justify those decisions holding the roy-
alty division orders unenforceable if they conffict with the lease, the
practicalities of the gas purchasing business do not. As discussed ear-
lier, the realities of gas production require that the lessee attempt to
provide a concrete basis upon which to carry out the lease obligation to
pay royalties.63 Since this concrete basis cannot be established in the
58. This view seems untenable since it is precisely to provide a reliable basis for royalty
payments that the lessee seeks the execution of the division order. It is also important to remem-
ber that a conflict between the lease and the division order may not always be readily apparent or
intentional and, in fact, may only be determined by judicial analysis.
59. The difficulty the industry member may have in predicting judicial interpretation of divi-
sion order language is discussed generally in Note, The Market Value Controversy: Exxon Corp.
v. Middleton, 16 TULSA L.J. 550 (1981).
60. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 (1973).
61. See Butler v. Exxon Corp., 559 S.W.2d 410, 417 (rex. Civ. App. 1977), writ refdn.r.e.
(refusing to recognize a detrimental reliance on the division orders).
62. See supra note 52 and accompanying text. Some courts have acknowledged that a divi-
sion order could be formed and written as a contract and thus bind the parties, but if not so
written, the division order cannot be made binding by the courts. See Kaufman v. Arnaudville
Co., 186 So. 2d 337, 342 (La. Ct. App. 1966):
It is entirely possible that a division order might be executed under such circumstances
as to constitute a contractual modification of the relations previously prevailing between
operator and royalty owner. But this should appear clearly. No court ought to infer an
intent to enter into such a contractual modification without cogent evidence thereof.
63. See supra notes 48-51 and accompanying text.
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lease due to numerous unknown factors existing at the time of the lease
execution, it must necessarily be established in a subsequent writing,
namely, the division order, at the time production is commenced. Be-
cause of the need to make more specific the general provisions of the
lease, the division order should not be disregarded as a mere writing
without effect, 64 even though it appears to contradict a lease provision.
The division order meets a practical industry need and, in the absence
of fraud and bad faith, should be given effect through an appropriate
legal analysis which does not offend traditional contract theory.65
B. Division Orders. Revocable Contracts?
A majority of the courts confronted with the issue of the enforce-
ability of division orders relies almost exclusively on a Texas case, Chi-
cago Corp. v. Wall." In Chicago, the Texas Supreme Court found that
the signing of division orders by royalty owners "created a contractual
relationship" between the royalty owners and the lessees. 67 Addressing
the consideration issue, the court found that the lessee's good faith and
reliance on the division orders were consideration for the formation of
a contract.6 At the time of the execution of the division order, there
was no consideration given to the royalty owners. Instead the court
focused on the lessee's subsequent reliance. Having found the division
orders enforceable as contracts, the Chicago court further held the or-
ders to be binding until revoked.6 9 Under traditional principles, a con-
tract cannot be unilaterally revoked without rendering the revoking
party liable for breach of contract.70 The Chicago opinion, however,
circumvents basic contract theory by defining division orders as en-
64. When courts refuse to enforce a division order as to royalties which have been paid and
accepted, they thwart the lessee's primary purpose in the execution of the division order by leaving
the lessee liable to suit for royalties already paid.
65. See generally Brown, supra note 17, at 185; Gregg, supra note 6, at 30-33; Stucky, supra
note 32, at 138-39.
66. 156 Tex. 217, 293 S.W.2d 844 (1956).
67. Id at -, 293 S.W.2d at 846.
68. Obviously, the [lessee] acted in good faith in following the instruction in the...
orders .... There is no evidence of probative force to sustain the finding of the jury
that the [lessee] did not rely on [such] orders. Since the [royalty owners] directed the
[lessee] as to how to credit and pay their royalty interest by the written. . . orders, they
cannot now claim that the [lessee] was not entitled to rely on such directions.
[Lessee] paid out the fund to others upon their faith in the solemn declarations of
the [royalty owners], and, until the division order and transfer orders are revoked, the
[lessee] has no alternative except to pay the fund to the persons named in the transfer
orders.
Id at -, 293 S.W.2d at 846-47.
69. Id at -, 293 S.W.2d at 847.
70. 1 A. CoaIwN, supra note 54, § 38.
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forceable contracts which may be revoked at will. 71
The Chicago court reached its conclusion after discussing Hogg v.
Magnolia Petroleum Co. ,72 a case involving oil division orders. As dis-
cussed above, the oil division order is viewed as the royalty owner's
standing offer to sell the royalty share of the oil produced.73 In keeping
with traditional contract principles, the oil division order may be uni-
laterally revoked before its acceptance. 74 The unilateral revocation of
gas division orders, on the other hand, is not supported by traditional
contract theory because the gas division order cannot be regarded as an
offer to sell.75 Nevertheless, the Chicago court applied the revocability
aspect of oil division orders to gas division orders to allow the royalty
owners to revoke the orders.
The Chicago case is the foundation for most subsequent opinions
interpreting gas division orders as binding until revoked.76 Although
the Chicago opinion provides both protection to the lessee for royalty
payments made and accepted according to the division order and a cer-
tain degree of flexibility to the royalty owner, who may revoke the divi-
sion order at any time, there is no adequate legal theory to support that
court's conclusion. Without theoretical support, the opinion does not
provide a consistent judicial effect,77 thus gas producers relying on divi-
sion orders to make royalty payments remain on uncertain legal
ground. 8
C. Executory Accord
Oil and gas division orders provide an important link in the oil
71. 156 Tex. at -, 293 S.W.2d at 846-47. The court offers no specific explanation for its
conclusion but does refer to both the lessee's "reliance" and the contractual nature of oil division
orders.
72. 267 S.W. 482 (Tex. Civ. App. 1924).
73. See supra notes 32-38 and accompanying text.
74. 1 A. CORBIN, supra note 54, § 38.
75. See supra notes 42-47 and accompanying text.
76. See, e.g., Bankers Life Ins. Co. of Nebraska v. Scurlock Oil Co., 447 F.2d 997, 1002 (5th
Cir. 1971); J.M. Huber Corp. v. Denman, 367 F.2d 104, 110 (5th Cir. 1966); Exxon Corp. v. Mid-
dleton, 613 S.W.2d 240, 250 (Tex. 1981); Smith v. Liddell, 367 S.W.2d 662, 666-67 (Tex. 1963);
Koenning v. Manco Corp., 521 S.W.2d 691, 697 (Tex. Civ. App. 1975).
77. See, e.g., Exxon Corp. v. Middleton, 613 S.W.2d 240,249-52 (Tex. 1981). The trial court
found the division orders to be supported by consideration, and thus enforceable, but that such
orders could also be unilaterally revoked. The Court of Civil Appeals also found the division
orders enforceable, based, inter alia, on the statutory presumption that written contracts are sup-
ported by consideration, but held that they could not be unilaterally revoked. The Texas Supreme
Court, although first finding the division orders unenforceable, finally held them to be enforceable
and unilaterally revocable upon rehearing.
78. See supra note 28.
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and gas marketing process,79 as their relative permanence in form and
use amid legal and mineral production developments attests.80 The
sale doctrine provides legal justification for the enforcement of oil divi-
sion orders,8 ' yet no equivalent legal doctrine controls the enforcement
of gas division orders. In the absence of consistent legal treatment, gas
division orders are susceptible to abuse, either by overreaching lessees
or by royalty owners anticipating large court recoveries.
The division order serves the necessary function of providing spe-
cific instructions for royalty payments which could not practicably be
done at the time of the lease execution. Insofar as the division order is
used to effectuate this purpose it should be recognized and enforced by
courts when challenged. Yet division orders have been used to accom-
plish other purposes which they were not originally intended to accom-
plish.82 For example, if a division order is written to unilaterally
modify express provisions of the lease, it is an abuse of the division
order's purpose which should not be judicially upheld. A legal frame-
work is necessary for the consistent analysis of division orders, so that
those division orders serving a legitimate function in the lessee-lessor
relationship may be upheld while those being abusively manipulated
by one party are not enforced. The discussion following suggests the
executory accord as an appropriate legal framework for the analysis of
division orders.
The problem with gas division orders is contractual due to the
debtor-creditor relationship established by the lease royalty provision
between the royalty owners and the lessee.8 3 While the lease creates a
debt, in the event of production, it does not specify the amount of the
debt or even to whom it will be paid. Where a debt exists whose
amount or terms are unknown or in dispute, the parties may agree to
create an executory accord between themselves.84 An executory accord
is "an agreement for the future discharge of an existing claim by a sub-
stituted performance." 85 In the case of an executory accord, the consid-
eration for each party entering into this second contract is the benefit of
79. "As the lease is the contractual prerequisite of production, so the division order is the
basis of marketing and distribution." Ethridge, supra. note 16, at 127.
80. See supra note 5.
81. See supra notes 31-40 and accompanying text.
82. See Brown, supra note 17, at 185; Stucky, supra note 32, at 138.
83. See supra notes 44-47 and accompanying text.
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settling the acknowledged but uncertain debt. 6 As applied to the gas
division order, consideration for the contract would be each party's in-
terest in the actual payment of a specific amount of royalty, as opposed
to the duty or right to payment of an uncertain amount of royalty as
created in the lease.
The executory accord, as Corbin notes, 7 does not discharge the
previous debt. Instead it provides that the performance of the execu-
tory accord, rather than its formation, will discharge the previous debt.
In the event of the debtor's failure to perform, the creditor may sue the
debtor on the claim of the original debt or on the terms of the executory
accord. In the case of a gas lease, the lessee's failure to pay royalties
entitles the royalty owner to sue the lessee either on the terms of the
lease or those of the division order. Treated as an executory accord, the
division order does not replace or modify the lease, but rather exists as
a supplement to the lease upon which the lessee may base its perform-
ance of royalty payments.
In order for the gas division order to function as an executory ac-
cord, it must contain necessary contract language such as a recital of
consideration (establishing a certain amount for an unspecific debt) for
the contract's formation. The division order should be attended by ap-
propriate contract formalities, including the signature of all parties to
be bound by the order, so it is not mistaken for an attempted unilateral
modification of the lease.
Molding the division order into an executory accord through judi-
cial treatment and industry practice resolves the consideration issue
and transforms the order into an enforceable contract with regard to
payments made and accepted under its provisions. If written and judi-
cially recognized as a contract, the gas division order would not be rev-
ocable by one party and would be a more permanent commitment on
the part of both the lessee and the royalty owners. Such permanence
seems justified both by the importance of the division order royalty
stipulations and by the long-term arrangements in gas sales.8
As an executory accord, the division order would be enforceable
only insofar as it is designed to accomplish certain legitimate objec-
tives. The consideration for the division order as an executory accord
86. Id
87. Id "[lit is the promised performance that is to discharge the existing claim, and not the
promise to render such performance."
88. See Tara Petroleum Corp. v. Hughey, 630 P.2d 1269, 1273 & n.12 (Okla. 1981) (recogniz-
ing the necessity of long-term gas sales contracts).
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is the specification of a definite amount for the "unsettled debt" created
by the general royalty provision of the lease. As long as the division
order is used for that limited purpose, it may be enforced. To the ex-
tent that division orders are drafted to do something more than specify
the uncertain lease debt, they may be unenforceable unless additional
consideration is given.
Although some courts would summarily refuse enforcement of an
apparent amendment to the lease in the form of a division order,89 the
supremacy of the lease should not be maintained without reason. In
the case of gas leases, as has been discussed, the royalty provision can-
not be made specific. Only at the time of production and marketing
can royalty calculations and payments be made specific. The rationale
behind maintaining the supremacy of the lease, which is necessarily
vague and incomplete as to gas royalties, over the division order, which
is clear and specific as to royalty amounts, is difficult to sustain.
IV. CONCLUSION
As the market value of gas continues to rise, formerly acquiescent
royalty owners will continue to challenge the basis of their royalty pay-
ments. A legal analysis to accommodate the mutual interests underly-
ing the function of gas division orders must be developed. A single rule
cannot be established to determine the enforceability of gas division
orders, since each division order varies from the rest. A legal frame-
work, however, such as that of the executory accord, should be consist-
ently invoked for the coherent analysis and, when justified,
enforcement of gas division orders.
Susan McCready Edwards
89. See, e.g., Maddox v. Gulf Oil Corp., 567 P.2d 1326, 1328 (Kan. 1977) (division order
terms perceived as a unilateral attempt to amend the lease regarded as null and void).
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